Cooperation in local and global groups by Fellner, Gerlinde & Lünser, Gabriele K.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Gerlinde Fellner and Gabriele K. Lünser
Cooperation in local and global groups
Working Paper
Original Citation:
Fellner, Gerlinde and Lünser, Gabriele K. (2008) Cooperation in local and global groups.
Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 122. Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik,
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/256/
Available in ePubWU: July 2008
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Vienna University of Economics & B.A. 
 
Department of Economics Working Paper Series 
  
 
 
                                                 
* Financial support by the University of Bonn and the University of Erfurt is gratefully acknowledged. Lünser is 
also grateful for additional funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) via ELSE. We thank 
Dennis Dittrich, Glenn Harrison and Steffen Huck for valuable comments. 
† Vienna University of Economics and B.A, Department of Economics, Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria, e-
mail: gerlinde.fellner@wu-wien.ac.at 
‡ University College London, Department of Economics & ELSE, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK, e-
mail: g.luenser@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Cooperation in Local and Global Groups* 
 
 
Gerlinde Fellner† and Gabriele K. Lünser‡ 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 122, July 2008 
 
 
Abstract ― Multiple group memberships are the rule rather than the exception. 
Locally operating groups frequently offer the advantage of providing social recognition 
and higher marginal benefits to the individual, whereas globally operating groups may 
be more beneficial from a social perspective. Within a voluntary contribution 
environment we experimentally investigate the tension that arises when subjects belong 
to a smaller local and a larger global group. When the global public good is more 
efficient individuals first attempt to cooperate in the global public good. However, this 
tendency quickly unravels and cooperation in the local public good builds up. 
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1. Introduction and Related Literature 
People interacting in groups are often confronted with the problem to allocate their time and 
efforts between locally operating groups and globally operating groups. Consequently, actions 
in one group limit the possibility to get involved in the other. By nature, locally operating 
groups frequently offer the advantage of providing social recognition and higher marginal 
benefits to the individual, whereas work in global groups may be more beneficial from a 
broader social perspective, however also more anonymous. This is true for various forms of 
social situations like group work in organizations, environmental and political engagement or 
neighborhood interactions. 
In the specific context of organizations, the use of teams is one central device to coordinate 
work activities. It often occurs that employees are assigned to multiple teams on different 
hierarchical levels and, then, have to allocate their time and efforts between those different 
team assignments. For example, profit centers are a popular organizational structure. These 
profit centers are implemented such that some working team members also belong to 
subteams at a lower hierarchical level to ensure sound communication between different 
organizational levels. 
In academia, research and teaching staff has to divide work time between serving the chair or 
an institute and working for the department which may require different efforts as 
administration. Further, as an environmental activist, one faces the decision to operate at a 
local level, i.e. within neighborhoods and communities, or at a more global level with national 
and international commitment. 
In this paper, we investigate the tension between cooperation for a local public good that 
offers recognition and facilitates coordination with others and a global public good that is 
socially more efficient, however more anonymous. Note that another way of thinking about 
local and global public goods is to differentiate whether the public good is pure or impure in 
the sense of excludability. In a pure (global) public good others cannot be excluded, while in 
an impure (local) public good only some subjects can participate (see, for instance, Sandler 
and Tschirhart, 1980; Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 
In the experimental literature on cooperation that largely relies on public good games, it is 
well established that higher marginal (per capita) returns from cooperation increase the 
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willingness to cooperate (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; Isaac et al., 1994; Fisher et al., 1995). 
When thinking of marginal benefits from local or global group projects, it can be safely 
assumed that the individual marginal return is higher in the former. Projects or groups that 
operate on a local level usually provide more direct benefits to their members than global 
projects. Additionally, interaction is closer, i.e., local groups enable mutual monitoring and 
hold the opportunity of gaining social approval. Both factors have an advantageous effect on 
cooperation1, especially because they are likely prerequisites of reciprocity and conditional 
cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). Thus, when people are 
confronted with the decision to allocate resources to a local or a global project, they are likely 
to favor the local one. 
However, another important behavioral motive in social interaction is the concern for 
efficiency. Individuals prefer more efficient outcomes over less efficient ones, and tend to 
choose actions that maximize social surplus or the minimum payoff in a group. This tendency 
is not only observable for public good provision but also in bargaining or distribution games 
(e.g., see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Levati et al., 2007). Public good projects on a global 
level usually require the help of many individuals, but once cooperation has emerged, the 
beneficial effects for society are potentially huge2 and often higher than benefits from local 
projects. Hence, in light of this tension between higher marginal payoffs combined with social 
recognition in a local group and higher potential revenues for society in a global project, it is 
interesting to ask what kind of projects are preferred and how individuals choose to divide 
their efforts among them.  
Given a present incentive structure, the tendency to cooperate is not a universal and stable 
personality trait. A couple of studies have already shed light on whether the composition of 
groups has an impact on cooperation behavior. For instance, Falk et al. (2003) have shown 
that people differentiate their cooperative attitude between different groups they are affiliated 
with. Similarly, Carpenter and Cardenas (2005) uncovered that individuals significantly 
change their behavior in a common pool resource game depending on the cultural diversity 
                                                 
1 For studies on the effects of monitoring others’ behavior on cooperation see, for instance, Sell and Wilson 
(1991), Cason and Khan (1999) or Carpenter (2007). Social approval as a motive for cooperation and charitable 
giving has been empirically investigated by Harbaugh (1998), Romano and Yildirim (2001), van de Ven (2002), 
Gächter et al. (1996), Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Lampel and Bhalla (2007). Models of status seeking within a 
rational choice framework are presented by Jaeger (2004) or Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004). 
2 For instance, in line with the current political debate, the endeavor to reduce overall CO2 emissions requires 
international coordination, but only these global cooperation efforts enable large social benefits worldwide. 
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within the group.  Hence, were it not for diverging incentives, it is likely that individuals still 
follow different strategies when deciding how to contribute to a local and global project.  
In our study, we use a simple public good design where each individual belongs to a smaller 
local group and a larger global group. In the local group, previous contributions of all 
members are revealed and the person with the highest contribution in a round is highlighted in 
the list, which resembles additional social recognition. Contributions in the global group are 
on the contrary not revealed. To generate the tension between recognition and efficiency, 
contributions to the global public good entail higher social efficiency despite the fact that the 
individual marginal benefit from the global public good is lower than from the local public 
good. Additionally, we have a control group where the efficiency of the local and global 
public good is equally high. This is achieved by decreasing the marginal benefit of the global 
public good. Results reveal that stable cooperation is only achieved in the local interaction. 
When the global public good is more efficient, individuals first attempt to cooperate for the 
global public good. However, this tendency quickly unravels and cooperation in the local 
public builds up and remains stable. 
A study similar to ours has been conducted by Wachsman (2002), who also investigates 
individuals’ simultaneous contributions to a local and a global public good using additionally 
different communication rules. The results indicate that individuals always attempt to reach 
cooperation in the more efficient global exchange. Our results do not confirm these findings, 
however most likely because of some elementary differences in the design. For instance, 
Wachsman employed social benefits of full cooperation for the global public good that were 
by one third higher than in our study. Most importantly, however, our design provides a more 
anonymous setting where the global group is not easily identifiable to participants.3  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the 
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes 
with a summary and a brief discussion. 
                                                 
3 We like to mention that Blackwell and McKee (2003) pursued a very similar research question. They find that 
people cooperate in the more efficient global public good but not at the expense of cooperation in local public 
goods. Strikingly, the results of this paper rely on only one independent observation per experimental treatment 
which can hardly be seen as solid evidence. Thus, we abstain from relating our results to these particular 
findings. 
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The main feature of our experimental design puts the same person at the same time into a 
local environment and into a global environment. Thus, a person simultaneously acts within 
two environments which are technologically not independent from each other. In reality, 
multiple memberships are the rule rather than the exception. It seems therefore quite realistic 
that one’s endowment, i.e. the time budget and efforts, has to be divided upon several 
memberships. In the same line of reasoning actions in one group often limit the possible 
actions in another group, i.e. actions for the local group restrict the time one can get involved 
with the global group actions. Our global environment is designed in such a way that it 
comprises the entire local groups, reflecting for example a situation of different departments 
in a company or different communities in a state. The implementation of our group design is 
shown in Figure 1. Eight subjects form a so-called global group (G) which is composed of 
two local groups (L1 and L2) of four subjects each. 
 
Figure 1: Group composition with two local and one global group 
A B C D E F G H 
Capital letters represent different subjects in the experiment. 
 
Each subject has to contribute to a slightly altered group cooperation dilemma, also known in 
its basic form as a linear public good. Many economic decisions happen in an environment 
where subjects contribute to a group project and the total output is (equally) shared between 
its members. In our experiment, each subject is endowed with 20 points and has to decide 
how to allocate this endowment to a local group project, a global group project and a private 
account respectively. Thus, for example a contribution to the local group project li diminishes 
the possible contribution to the global group project gi as well as to the private account, i.e. 
the following budget constraint has to hold: 20≤+ ii gl . For simplicity, the size of the local 
and the global group project, respectively, are just the sum of all contributions to it. The 
payoff function for each subject i is the following: 
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1 , where al (ag) is the marginal per capita return of the local 
(global) group project and j and k are the indices for team members of the local and global 
group respectively. 
Our group design allows for an investigation into the influence of efficiency and social 
recognition in (overlapping) local and global groups. We compare a situation in which the 
local and the global group projects are equally efficient with a situation in which the global 
group project is more efficient than the local group project, when at the same time a social 
recognition mechanism exists only for the local group project in both setups, i.e. subjects can 
observe each others contributions only in the local project. Therefore, we implemented a 
history window in which subjects could keep track of contributions to the local group project 
on an individual level. Moreover, the highest contribution was emphasized, showing clearly 
who contributed most. Thus, the experimental design includes two treatments. G-low denotes 
the treatment with a lower global marginal per capita return ag which leads to the same 
efficiency in the local and global group project and G-high denotes the treatment with a 
higher global marginal per capita return ag which leads to a higher efficiency in the global 
group project. Table 1 gives an overview of the experimental design and also shows the 
parameters for the respective treatments. While the local marginal per capita return al is set 
equal to 0.4 in both treatments, resulting in a local efficiency of 1.6, the global marginal per 
capita return ag differs between both treatments: In G-low ag equals 0.2 and in G-high ag 
equals 0.3, resulting in a global efficiency of 1.6 and 2.4 respectively. Since the marginal per 
capita return of the local and global public goods are smaller than 1, a contribution of zero – 
to any group project – is the only strategy that survives repeated elimination of dominated 
strategies in this finitely repeated game. The socially efficient outcome is achieved when 
everybody invests nothing to the private account in G-low4 and fully invests their endowment 
to the global group project in G-high, since this maximizes total payoffs. 
The experiment was conducted in the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn. In total, 128 
students of various disciplines who had not taken part in a public goods experiment before, 
volunteered to participate. Subjects were recruited over the internet with ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). The experiment itself was computerized, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). It was 
                                                 
4 Note that it does not matter how the endowment is allocated between group projects. 
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conducted in four sessions with 16 participants in each treatment. Each subject was allowed to 
participate in one session only. 
Table 1: Design of the experiment 
 treatments 
 G-low G-high 
Design   
# rounds 20 20 
# participants  64 64 
local group size 4 4 
global group size 8 8 
# global groups 8 8 
endowment in points 20 20 
   
Parameters   
local marginal per capita return al 
(local efficiency) 
0.4 
(1.6) 
0.4 
(1.6) 
global marginal per capita return ag 
(global efficiency) 
0.2 
(1.6) 
0.3 
(2.4) 
Before starting the experiment, instructions were handed out to all participants who were 
visually separated by booths in the laboratory.5 Thereafter, participants had to answer 
computerized control questions to demonstrate their understanding of the game and the payoff 
calculation. The experiment did not start before all participants answered all questions 
correctly. Right before the decision part of the experiment started participants were randomly 
and anonymously assigned to groups of eight which were additionally divided into two 
groups of four: The group of eight representing the global group and the group of four 
representing the local group (see Figure 1). Thus, all subjects of a local group were at the 
same time − among a second local group − part of a global group. The composition of the 
local and the global group was kept anonymous and constant during the experiment and 
subjects were aware of this. We ran four sessions for each treatment comprising two global 
groups each. 
Each of the eight members of a global group received an identification letter, i.e. a capital 
letter from A through H. In each round, subjects had to allocate their endowment to the 
                                                 
5 Original instructions were written in German. They are available from the authors upon request. A translation 
is given in the Appendix. 
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private account and the two respective group projects on the same screen. Thereafter the 
computer calculated the resulting round payoffs for each subject and gave in addition to the 
allocation of the own endowment the following feedback: the sum of all contributions and the 
average contribution of all respective local group members, the sum of all contributions and 
the average contribution of all respective global group members as well as the round payoff 
which was furthermore subdivided into the payoff from the local and the payoff from the 
global group project. Additionally, on the left hand side of the screen subjects could keep 
track of the individual contributions of the four local group members in all previous rounds. 
With the help of a history window we displayed past decisions of local group members in 
columns, each column representing a local group member and each row representing one past 
period. Each local group member could be identified by his identification code which was 
displayed above each column. The highest contribution to the local group project in a period 
was set off in color. 
Subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other besides via the experimental 
software. One session consisted of 20 rounds, i.e. 20 repetitions of the stage game. During the 
experiment subjects’ payoffs were given in points which in the end were exchanged into 
Euros at a previously known exchange rate of 75 points per 1 Euro. Sessions lasted for about 
45 minutes, and on average subjects earned 7.81 Euros. 
3. Experimental Results 
In total, we collected 5120 contribution decisions that are analyzed in this section with respect 
to our research focus. Table 2 provides a first overview of contributions to the global public 
good, the local public good and the points kept on the private account, aggregated over the 
eight independent observations per treatment and averaged over all 20 rounds. At a first 
glance, the average local contribution is considerably higher than the average global 
contribution in the G-low treatment, whereas no such difference is observable in the G-high 
treatment. On average, even more is invested into the global account. The trend over rounds is 
calculated by the Pearson correlation coefficient between round number and average 
contributions for each independent observation. It shows that, on aggregate, local as well as 
global contributions are significantly declining in the G-low treatment. In the G-high 
treatment, however, local contributions remain fairly constant over rounds while global 
contributions also decline significantly. 
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Table 2: Overview of average results 
 
average 
local 
contribution 
average 
global 
contribution 
average 
private 
points  
average 
earnings 
trend over 
all rounds 
of local 
contribution 
trend over 
all rounds 
of global 
contribution 
G-low 10.89 (2.85) 
1.38 
(0.72) 
7.73 
(2.49) 
7.35 
(0.97) 
-0.4826* 
 
-0.7155** 
 
G-high 
4.60 
(1.29) 
5.74 
(2.30) 
9.67 
(1.70) 
8.26 
(1.36) 
0.0019 
 
-0.7851** 
 
 treatment differences (p-values) 
G-low – G-high 0.001 0.000 0.074 0.005 0.019 0.097 
Standard deviation is given in parentheses. Average earnings are given in Euros. The trend over rounds is indicated by the 
average Pearson correlation coefficient. Significance levels of treatment differences result from Mann Whitney U-tests (one-
tailed). 
By using the Binomial test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis that the Pearson correlation coefficient is more often negative than positive: 
** significantly  more often negative than positive:   α ≤ 0.01  
* significantly  more often negative than positive:  0.01 ≤ α ≤ 0.05  
Figures 2a and 2b display the average local and global contributions over time and reveal 
different dynamics in both treatments. In the G-low treatment, local contributions exceed 
global contributions already in round 1 (Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test, p=0.012, two-tailed). 
While local contributions even increase from 45% of the endowment to about 65% in first 
four rounds before they gradually decrease, global contributions quickly drop to nearly zero. 
In the G-high treatment, however, local contributions fall substantially below global 
contributions in the first period (Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test, p=0.017, two-tailed) and first 
half of the experiment but seem to remain fairly constant throughout the course of the game, 
whereas global contributions decline rapidly and fall to below the level of local contributions 
in the second half of the experiment (neglecting the end-game effect in the last period). 
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Figure 2a: Average contribution in G-low 
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Figure 2b: Average contribution in G-high 
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The visual impression of Figures 2a and 2b suggests that in G-low, where efficiency is equal 
for both, the local and the global public good, individuals prefer the local public good. In G-
high however, the higher efficiency of the global public good attracts higher contributions in 
the beginning. Still, contributions to the local public good are more stable and do not show 
the usual decay over time except for the final round. This suggests that after cooperation for 
the socially more efficient public good cannot be sustained individuals attempt to coordinate 
their cooperative efforts in the local public good. In the following, this impression is 
statistically tested in several ways. Before going into detail on the trends of contributions in 
each treatment, an overview of contributions and efficiency is presented. 
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Figure 3: Average total contribution per treatment 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
round
av
er
ag
e 
to
ta
l c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
G-low G-high
 
Figure 3 shows average total contributions in the two different treatments. Average total 
contributions (measured as the sum of global and local contributions) are higher in the G-low 
treatment. This evidence is substantiated by a Mann Whitney U-test (p=0.040, one-tailed) on 
average total group contributions. A high initial level of cooperation and early coordination 
on the local public good are responsible for this somewhat counterintuitive result that in case 
of potentially higher social benefits cooperation is lower. Average efficiency, measured by 
the proportion of maximum profit that is actually achieved, lies at 85.51% in the G-low 
treatment and only at 64.14% in the G-high treatment. Thus, although in the G-high treatment 
cooperation finally stabilizes in the local public good, the coordination difficulties (given the 
tension between the local and the global public good) have adverse effects on social benefit. 
Table 3: Comparison of local and global contributions over time 
 Wilcoxon-Signed Ranks test 
z-values (p-values, two-tailed) 
 average local contribution vs.  average global contribution in periods 
 1 – 20 (overall) 
1 – 10 
(first half) 
11 – 20 
(second half) 
G-low 3.52 (0.000) 2.52 (0.012) 2.52 (0.012) 
G-high -0.88 (0.379) -2.24 (0.025) 1.26 (0.208) 
Table 3 shows that in the G-low treatment, local contributions are always significantly higher 
than global contributions. In the G-high treatment, significant differences can only be found 
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in the first part of the experiment, i.e., contributions for the global public good are higher in 
the first half of the experiment but not in the second. Since these non-parametric comparisons 
neglect the time series characteristics of the data, a regression analysis is run additionally. We 
estimate a random effects tobit regression on average group contributions. In particular, we 
want to investigate the different time trends in local and global contributions in the two 
treatments. 
Table 4: Random effects tobit regression on group contributions 
 G-low G-high 
dependent variable til  
t
ig  
t
il   
t
ig  
 coef. se coef. se coef. se  coef. se 
constant 13.111** 1.011 3.941** 0.453 3.726** 0.576  11.516** 0.862 
round -0.181** 0.036 -0.298** 0.022 0.103** 0.036  -0.567** 0.039 
last round dummy -6.309** 0.958 2.0290** 0.593 -5.354** 1.026  2.248* 1.052 
σi 2.611** 0.681 1.115** 0.309 1.140** 0.352  2.114** 0.569 
σu 2.445** 0.140 1.286** 0.086 2.455** 0.144  2.611** 0.153 
# of observations 160 160 160  160 
# lower censored / 
# uncensored / 
# upper censored 
0 / 160 / 0 43 / 117  / 0 6 / 154 / 0  6 / 154 / 0 
Method: Panel tobit regression [ ]20,0, ∈titi gl with global group random effects 
** p ≤ 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 4 shows that in the G-low treatment, both local contributions ( til ) and global 
contributions ( tig ) significantly decrease over rounds. Global contributions in the G-high 
treatment also decrease significantly over time. However, local contributions in the G-high 
even increase over rounds as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient. This 
suggests that in the G-high treatment subjects first indeed attempt to cooperate for the more 
efficient global public good, yet this tendency weakens quickly. While cooperation for the 
global public good decreases, subjects cooperate in the local public good and are increasingly 
able to coordinate contributions on a stable level. Apparently, coordination is easier to 
achieve in the local group because of closer interaction and signaling possibilities by 
revealing individual contributions. 
  12
Table 5: Tobit regression on individual contributions including period 1 to 19 
 G-low G-high 
dependent variable til  
t
ig  
t
il   
t
ig  
 coef. se coef. se coef. se  coef. se 
constant -2.186 1.753 0.187 2.405 -5.422 3.096  -1.426 4.321 
lagged average 
 local contribution 1.216
** 0.097 -0.247** 0.087 1.414** 0.204  -0.289** 0.112 
lagged average 
global contribution 0.013 0.223 1.370
** 0.275 -0.013 0.138  1.416** 0.184 
accumulated 
frequency of highest 
local contribution 
2.118** 0.448 -0.818 0.514 1.899** 0.616  -0.606 0.687 
round -0.360** 0.105 -0.149 0.143 -0.185 0.124  -0.278* 0.109 
round* accumulated 
frequency of highest 
local contribution 
-0.090** 0.022 0.030 0.018 -0.074 0.040  0.048 0.039 
Wald χ2 (5) 935.84 142.74 281.91  208.82 
p > χ2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001  < 0.001 
# of observations 1152 1152 1152  1152 
# lower censored /  
# uncensored / 
# upper censored 
166 / 686 / 300 835 / 313 / 4 426 / 634 / 92  455 / 586 / 111 
Method: Tobit regression [ ]20,0, ∈titi gl  for periods 1 to 19 with robust standard errors (for clustering of global groups) 
** p ≤ 0.01, * p < 0.05 
To gain a deeper understanding what drives contributions over time, we investigate individual 
contributions in a tobit regression model with additional clustering on global groups. (Table 
5).6 Our analysis only considers data up to period 19, as we observe a strong endgame effect 
in the last period. The dependent variables are either local contributions ( til ) or global 
contributions ( tig ) and the independent variables are the lagged average contributions of all 
group members for the local and the global public good, the accumulated frequency of being 
the group member with the highest local contribution, the round and an interaction variable of 
frequency of the highest local contribution and round. The rational behind the last variable is 
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that one could expect the social signal of being the highest contributor to have a differential 
effect throughout time. 
Results indicate that the lagged average contribution in the local group is influential in both 
treatments: it positively affects the local contribution and negatively affects the global 
contribution. The lagged average contribution in the global group positively affects the 
current global contribution, but has no negative spillover effect on local contributions. The 
accumulated frequency of being the highest local contributor has a significant positive impact 
on local contributions, both in the G-low and the G-high treatment.7 However, this effect is 
weakening over rounds in the G-low treatment and remains constant in the G-high treatment. 
If the pursuit of social recognition becomes more prominent over time, one would expect a 
positive interaction between the frequency of highest local contribution previously received 
and the number of rounds. We find, however, the opposite: the impact of received recognition 
decreases over time at least in the G-low treatment. After controlling for all the other factors, 
the typical decay is only found for local contributions in the G-low treatment and global 
contributions in the G-high treatment.  
Let us step back and take another look at the different contribution trends over time. In the  
G-low treatment, global contributions are already on a low level to start with, therefore there 
is only little room for a distinct declining trend that is observed with local contributions. What 
is remarkable, however, is that local contributions in the G-high treatment do not show the 
usual decay. This hints at cooperation patterns in the local public good that are not 
independent from the global public good. It seems that cooperation first pools on a global 
level if this promises to be more efficient. However, as soon as this tendency weakens, 
cooperation is rescued on the local level on which it can be more easily sustained. In contrast, 
when cooperative efforts concentrate on the local level right from the start as in G-low, no 
such compensation on another level is possible and cooperation destabilizes.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
The starting point of our study mirrors the basic phenomenon that subjects typically have 
multiple group memberships. Time or other constraints necessitate that activities are divided 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The results in Table 5 are qualitatively equivalent to results of a random effects tobit regression. Yet, as in our 
sample the panel variance decreased with an increase in the number of independent variables we rather report a 
non-panel tobit model to present more detailed insights. 
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upon these memberships and, say, leisure. In our design individuals belong to a smaller local 
group and a larger global group that entirely comprises the local group. Such structures are 
typically found in work environments, politics, situations with environmental or 
neighborhood engagement, and even academia. 
In large environments, group members are not always able to observe to what extent others 
are willing to cooperate. In principle, the larger a group the more anonymous are individual 
actions. In the extreme, local activities are fully traceable while global activities are only 
observable on an aggregate level as the global group outcome. This paper investigates such a 
situation where individual peer contributions are observable for the local group interaction but 
not for the global one. In other words, in our setting only cooperation in the local group is 
facilitated by social recognition. By varying the marginal benefit in the global group we 
create two different conditions: one in which the global group is more efficient than the local 
group and one where both groups are equally efficient. The first condition allows us to study 
whether cooperation can be sustained in the more efficient global group despite less available 
information on contributions of peers or, put differently, whether cooperation omits efficiency 
considerations for the sake of social recognition. The second condition serves as a control for 
the tension between recognition and efficiency that we study.  
We find that when the local and the global group have the same efficiency subjects indeed opt 
for the local group, where, however, the familiar decay of contributions over rounds occurs. 
In contrast, when the global group is more efficient individuals first attempt to cooperate 
there. Yet, this tendency quickly deteriorates and cooperative efforts shift towards the more 
transparent local group. In the second half of the experiment, we even see higher contribution 
levels in the (less efficient) local group than in the (more efficient) global group. Overall, 
contributions in the local group are on a very stable, non-declining level throughout. This 
suggests that after cooperation for the socially more efficient public good cannot be sustained, 
individuals attempt to coordinate their cooperative efforts in the local public good where 
coordination is facilitated by monitoring contributions. Additionally, cooperation in the local 
public good is associated with social recognition. As we see in a more detailed analysis of 
behavior over time, the cumulative number of being the highest contributor has a positive 
impact on the own contributions, even when controlling for the own cooperative disposition.  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 This effect is not a mere effect of cooperative dispositions. When including the lag of the own (local or global) 
contribution in the regression, the coefficients are still significant. 
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In summary, our results suggest that while high efficiency indeed attracts contributions 
initially, cooperation can not be sustained by the prospect of high efficiency gains alone. A 
smaller, manageable environment where mutual monitoring is possible seems to be more 
successful in stabilizing cooperation. The large body of literature (relying on various 
parameterizations) on reciprocal behavior and its potential to stabilize cooperation takes the 
same line. Future research should therefore address the issue whether the introduction of 
mutual monitoring and recognition components can persistently promote cooperation for the 
more efficient (global) public projects, even in large and not readily manageable 
environments. In light of possible lower social welfare due to coordination problems that arise 
from the tension between a more transparent local and a more efficient global interaction, the 
search for appropriate institutions which promote cooperation becomes fundamental. 
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Appendix: Instructions (Treatment G-high) 
(Original instructions were in German. They are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please do not talk to other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come to your cabin and answer your question privately. 
 
In the experiment you will have to make decisions. These instructions will inform you about the decisions you 
have to make and their consequences. Depending on your decisions you can earn money which will be paid cash 
to you at the end of the experiment. Throughout the experiment we will denote all amounts in points. Points will 
be converted to Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
75 points = 1 Euro 
The Experiment 
At the beginning of the experiment the participants will be randomly divided into groups of eight. Within this 
global group of eight, two local groups of four persons are formed.  Therefore, you belong to a local group of 4 
persons and at the same time you are a member of a global group of eight persons (see figure). The composition 
of groups remains constant throughout the experiment. The experiment consists of 20 rounds. Before the first 
round, each member of the global group receives an identification code (A, B, C, D, E, F, G or H) on the screen 
that she keeps for all rounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each round of the experiments consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how to divide your 
endowment between a private account and two different projects. In the second stage you receive feedback on 
your income.  
Detailed description of each round 
Stage 1: 
At the beginning of each round, every participant receives an endowment of 20 points. Your task is to decide, 
how to use this endowment. In particular, you have to decide how many points to transfer to a private account 
and how many points to transfer to two different, common projects with your group members. Your total income 
in each round is the sum of the income from your private account and the income from the two projects.  
Your income from the private account 
    local group 1    local group 2 
 global group 
A C B D E GF H
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Each point which you transfer to your private account earns an income of 1 point. That means, if you transfer a 
specific amount (x points) to your private account, you receive exactly an income of x points from the private 
account. No-one except you profits from the points in your private account. 
Your income from the two possible projects 
There are two possible projects, a local project and a global project.  
Your income from the local project is calculated in the following way: The transfers of all four local group 
members to the local project are summed up and multiplied by 0.4.  
Your income from the local project = 0.4 x (sum of four transfers of the local group) 
The income from the local project is calculated in the same way for all local group members, i.e. your local 
group members receive the same income from the local project as you. Therefore, you and the three other 
members of your local group benefit from your transfer to the local project.  
Your income from the global project is calculated in the following way: The transfers of all eight global group 
members to the global project are summed up and multiplied by 0.4. 
Your income from the global project = 0.4 x (sum of eight transfers of the global group) 
The income from the global project is calculated in the same way for all global group members, i.e. your global 
group members receive the same income from the global project as you. Therefore, you and the seven other 
members of your global group benefit from your transfer to the global project.  
Your total income in each round: 
Total income =  
   Income from the private account 
+ 0.4 x (sum of 4 transfers of the local group to the local project)  
+ 0.4 x (sum of 8 transfers of the global group to the global project) 
For each point you transfer to the private account, you receive an income of 1 point. 
Supposing you transferred this point to the local project instead, then the sum of transfers to the local project 
would rise by one point. Your income from the local project would then rise by 0.4 x 1 = 0.4 points. However, 
the income of the other local group members would also rise by 0.4 points each, so that the total income from 
the local project for you and the other local group members (4 persons in total) would rise by 1.6 points. Your 
transfer to the local project therefore also increases the income of the local group members. Similarly, the 
transfers of your local group members to the local project increase your income. For each point that your local 
group members transfer to the local project, you receive an income of 0.4 x 1 = 0.4 points. 
For the global project, the case is analogous. Supposing you transferred this point to the global project 
instead, then the sum of transfers to the global project would rise by one point. Your income from the global 
project would then rise by 0.4 points. However, the income of the other global group members would also rise 
by 0.4 points, so that the total income from the global project for you and the other global group members (8 
persons in total) would rise by 3.2 points. Your transfer to the global project therefore also increases the income 
of the global group members. Similarly, the transfers of your global group members to the global project 
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increase your income. For each point that your global group members transfer to the global project, you receive 
an income of 0.4 x 1 = 0.4 points.  
Stage 2: 
In the second stage you receive feedback on your income and its components in the particular round. On the 
screen, you see how you have divided your endowment between your private account, the local project and the 
global project. You learn about your income from the private account, the local project and the global project. 
Moreover, you see the sum of transfers and the average transfer of the local group to the local project and of the 
global group to the global project. 
Furthermore, on the left side of the screen you will additionally find a list of all transfers of your local group 
members to the local project. This list is continued throughout all rounds, whereby each local group member is 
identifiable via his or her unique identification code. The highest transfer within the local group in the particular 
round is highlighted in green color. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand. Before the experiment starts, you are asked to answer some 
control questions on screen. These questions serve the purpose to check your understanding of the experimental 
procedure and are not relevant for your final payment. As soon as each participant has answered all control 
questions correctly, the experiment will start.  The sum of all points earned over the 20 rounds will be converted 
into Euro and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Thank you for participating and good luck! 
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